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Palabras clave
Política comercial
óptima, comercio
intraindustrial,
diferenciación
de productos

Se propone un modelo teórico para explicar la heterogeneidad
observada en la adopción de leyes antidumping por pequeños países en vía de desarrollo en un contexto de reducción arancelaria
multilateral. El análisis se basa en un juego de tres etapas de determinación de política comercial con competencia imperfecta
en productos diferenciados, donde la posible presión para la protección se refleja en la función objetivo del gobierno y donde los
aranceles se pueden consolidar como resultado de acuerdos comerciales multilaterales. Este marco implica que la aplicación de
este dispositivo de protección administrativa es la mejor respuesta
del gobierno cuando los aranceles consolidados multilaterales alcanzan un umbral los suficientemente bajo. La heterogeneidad
en la decisión de adopción se explica por el tamaño relativo del
mercado nacional, el grado de diferenciación de los productos y
los motivos de economía política. Las relativamente grandes economías, los mercados nacionales altamente competitivos y los
países con una alta presión interna para la protección promulgan
leyes antidumping mucho más rápido.

A liberalização comercial e adoção de leis
antidumping em países em desenvolvimento
Resumo

Palavras chave
Política comercial
ótima, comércio
intraindustrial,
diferenciação de
produtos

Proponhe-se um modelo teórico para explicar a heterogeneidade
observada na adoção de leis antidumping por pequenos países
em via de desenvolvimento em um contexto de redução tarifária multilateral. A análise baseia-se em um jogo de três etapas de
determinação de política comercial com competência imperfeita em produtos diferenciados, onde a possível pressão para a
proteção seja refletida na função objetivo do governo e onde as tarifas possam se consolidar como resultado de acordos comerciais
multilaterais. Este marco implica que a aplicação deste dispositivo de proteção administrativa é a melhor resposta do governo
quando as tarifas consolidadas multilaterais alcançam um limiar
suficientemente baixo. A heterogeneidade na decisão de adoção
se explica pelo tamanho relativo do mercado nacional, o grau de
diferenciação dos produtos, e os motivos de economia política.
As relativamente grandes economias, os mercados nacionais altamente competitivos e os países com uma alta pressão interna para
a proteção promulgam leis antidumping mais rapidamente.
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Introduction
The international trading system established by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), has
resulted in a multilateral tariff reduction around the world. However, concurrently
with this trade liberalization episode, Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) have arisen as
a mechanism to protect domestic industries. Among these NTBs, antidumping
(AD) has been the preferred protectionism tool. Originally, it was primarily used
by developed countries and later spread out among developing countries (Miranda et al., 1998; Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2004). The application of the AD procedure
and the subsequent imposition of duties require a national AD legislation that
must be aligned with the Uruguay Round AD Agreement that entered into force
on January 1st, 1995.
This paper provides the first theoretical framework to understand the underlying motives that lead developing countries to adopt an AD legislation. The
main purpose is to explain the heterogeneity observed in the adoption decision
among developing countries in an environment of multilateral trade liberalization. One of the most important insights of the AD literature is that the mere
presence of AD legislation can affect the behavior of firms, even if no AD duty
is ever imposed (Blonigen & Prusa, 2001), and thus this model is not about the
determinants of the use of AD protection—a murky issue in reality—but is instead about the underlying motives that influence a country’s decision to adopt
an AD law in the first place.AD is an exception to the GATT/WTO principle of
non-discrimination. Provided that there is dumping, which is generally defined as
exporting below “normal value”,1 and that it causes or threatens material injury to
domestic industry, a country is entitled to levy discriminatory duties on imports.
Even though this legal apparatus was intended to deter predatory pricing in international trade, there is a consensus in AD literature that it has degraded to a quick
and easy way to grant protection from import competition without violating WTO
rules. Hence, dumping and injury determination has little connection with the
intended economic motives to stop “unfair” trade. As Blonigen and Prusa (2003)
argue, AD duties are simply the modern form of protection.

Article VI of the GATT defines normal value as an export price lower than the price charged
by the exporter in its own market or as pricing below production cost plus selling, general, and
administrative expenses, and profits.

1
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Figure 1. Multilateral Trade Rounds and Countries with AD Legislation
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While the developed world has had AD legislation in place for a long time,
the past three decades have witnessed an increase in the adoption of AD laws in
developing countries. In fact, by the end of the negotiations in the Tokyo Round
in 1980, almost all developed countries had enacted AD legislation,2 whereas
only 15 developing countries had done so. Figure 1 illustrates the heterogeneity
between developing countries in terms of the adoption decision after 1980 and
highlights the multilateral trade rounds. Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008)
analyze the determinants of this proliferation of trade protection laws and the
observed heterogeneity of the time of the adoption by using these data. They employ a duration analysis to find that retaliatory motive, past trade liberalization,
and the size of the chemicals sector and the extent of steel imports are positively
correlated with the probability of adopting AD legislation.

Years
Source: Own elaboration.

This paper links the optimal tariff literature with the optimal AD policy literature under the possibility of exogenous multilateral binding tariffs. The analysis is
based on a three-stage game of trade policy determination in a small developing
economy with imperfect competition in differentiated products. The government
chooses whether or not to adopt an AD legislation and sets the domestic tariff,
2

Spain and Iceland enacted AD legislations in 1982 and 1987, respectively.
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which may be exogenously bound due to multilateral trade agreements, in the
first and the second stage, respectively. In the third stage, duopoly competition
occurs in a Cournot fashion between the domestic firm and the foreign firm.
When setting tariffs, the government takes into account the lobbying pressure for
protection that domestic firm can bring to bear.
This simple theoretical framework explains three key elements in the adoption decision in developing countries. First, dumping is a natural strategy of the
foreign firm in the sense that it always takes place due to three features of the
model (proposition 1): cross-country differences in size, the degree of product
differentiation, and the extent of tariff protection. Second, progressive multilateral
tariff reduction entails the existence of a threshold tariff where the government
decides to adopt AD legislation in order to protect domestic industry from import
competition (proposition 2). Third, the heterogeneity observed in the adoption
decision is explained by three idiosyncratic factors (proposition 3): political economy motives, the relative size of domestic economy, and the degree of product
differentiation. Countries with high lobbying pressure, relatively large economies
and highly competitive domestic markets enact AD legislation sooner.
Theoretical AD literature has converged mainly around the determinants of
dumping and the process of imposition of AD duties in developed countries.3 As
data on AD duties in developing countries have become available,4 there is a rising
interest in empirically studying these topics in developing countries. MoragaGonzález and Viaene (2004) address at the theoretical level the incentives of
foreign firms to undertake dumping in developing and transition economies. The
authors use a two-country model where trade occurs among oligopolistic firms,
which differ in terms of efficiency, in a single quality-differentiated product and
countries differ in the distribution of consumer preferences. In this context, dumping always arises and governments have incentives to levy tariff on high-quality
imports. They argue that since the implications of this policy—namely the impact on the pricing behavior of exporting firms and the ineffectiveness of the
arbitrage of goods—do not stop dumping by the foreign firm, governments must
adopt AD laws to counteract the effect of their trade policy. Although this paper
provides a complete characterization of the occurrence of dumping in developing
countries, the argument for the adoption decision is not the result of comparing

3

Blonigen and Prusa (2001) provide a review on the relevant AD literature.

Bown (2007) and Zanardi (2004) provide data on the use of AD duties and on the year of
adoption on AD legislation among developing countries, respectively.

4
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the economic gains and losses of market participants of enacting the law but it is
just a conjecture from the analytical model. Lastly, the model does not take into
account the role of trade liberalization in the adoption decision.
Moore and Suranovic (1994) examine the welfare effects of using AD duties
in a trade-liberalizing country. They propose a general equilibrium model with
one import and one export sector, where tariffs are reduced and an AD duty is
simultaneously introduced. The welfare impact depends on the size of the tariff
liberalization, the probability that the industry gets AD protection, the size of the
AD duty, and the resource cost filling and adjudicating the AD petition. Using a numerical simulation, they generate liberalization scenarios that result in national
welfare losses. This article does not address the existence of dumping and assumes
that AD protection is triggered by the harm that trade liberalization causes on the
domestic firm. There is no explanation of the theoretical motives of enacting AD
legislation in the first place.
Anderson et al. (1995) provide a theoretical explanation about the underlying
motives to adopt AD legislation in developed countries. The authors employ a
differentiated products oligopoly model to characterize firm rivalry in a two-stage
model where governments choose whether or not to impose antidumping laws in
the first stage. They assume that markets are separated by a barrier to trade of the
same size in each direction, which can be either a transport cost or a tariff. They
find that the non-cooperative equilibrium is to not enact AD legislation if governments unilaterally maximize domestic welfare. However, welfare may improve if
laws are enacted when the barrier to trade involves a transport cost, but not if the
barrier is a tariff. Their analysis differs from my model in at least two dimensions:
First, they consider the bilateral decision of adopting trade protection laws in
developed countries, whereas I focus on the unilateral decision of a developing
country. Second, they do not consider the role of trade liberalization in the adoption decision.
This paper is organized as follows: first a formal overview of the model is presented; then, I analyze trade protection under segmented markets and integrated
markets, followed by the equilibrium choice with homogeneous goods and the
role of trade liberalization. Finally, I explore the determinants of the time pattern
of adoption, previous to the concluding remarks.
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The Model
Consider a two-country, two-good model with two identical firms producing a
differentiated good. Markets are segmented. Firm 1 is located in the home country, whereas firm 2 is located in the foreign country. Countries differ in their
market size. The developing country (home) has a market of size ɑ, whereas the
developed country (foreign) has a market size of ɑ*, (ɑ ≤ ɑ*). Foreign firm is a
monopolist in its local market, but competes with a domestic firm in the home
country’s market.5 Let xi be the quantity of the product manufactured by firm i,
i = {1, 2}, to be sold in the home country. Likewise, x2 is the quantity of the product
manufactured by firm 2 to be sold in the foreign country. Home (foreign) representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function of the available products in the
market xi, i = {1, 2}, (x2) and linear in a numeraire good m (m*).
(1)

(2)
Therefore, there are no income effects on the monopolistic sector, and I can
perform partial equilibrium analysis. The degree of product differentiation is
given by the parameter c, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. The maximum degree of product differentiation corresponds to c = 0 (independent goods) while the minimum degree
of product differentiation corresponds to c = 1 (homogeneous goods). These utility
functions generate the following linear inverse demand function for product i:
(3)
(4)

Shutting down exports in the developing country greatly simplifies the analysis. A model with
bilateral trade would require a large difference in market sizes, a high degree of product differentiation, and a binding antidumping legislation in the developed country.

5
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Given that the slope coefficients of the two inverse demand equations are
identical, I use the intercept to designate differences in market sizes.6
I consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. The
status-quo of the game is segmented markets (i.e. no AD law in place). In the
first stage the domestic government (DG) decides whether or not to adopt an
antidumping legislation. An antidumping law is modeled as an extra constraint
imposed on the foreign firm preventing it from discriminating between markets.
If the government decides to enact such a law, firm 2 chooses {x2, x2}subject to
constraint p2 – τ ≥ p2 , and firm 2’s markets will be integrated. If there is not an
antidumping law, firm 2 chooses {x2, x2} without restriction, and firm 2 will be said
to segment its markets.
In the second stage, the government sets a domestic tariff (τ ≥ 0), which may
be exogenously bound (τ) by multilateral trade rounds. It is assumed that government maximizes social welfare, composed of the consumer surplus, the profits of
the domestic firm, and the tariff revenue. The domestic profits are weighted by a
factor λ < 1, which represents the lobbying pressure that domestic firm can bring
to bear.
G = cs + λπ1 + τx2

(5)

In this context, consumers do not lobby due to the diffuse nature of their losses.7 This politically realistic government objective function may be derived either
from a standard lobbying pressure group model (Baldwin, 1987) or from the median voter model of Mayer (1984) (as cited in Feenstra & Lewis, 1991). Variable
λ measures the DG’s valuation of a dollar of domestic firm’s profits relative to its
valuation of a dollar of consumer welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and the
tariff revenue).8
In the last stage, the domestic firm (DF) and the foreign firm (FF) compete
in the domestic market in a Cournot fashion, taking the government trade policy

Even though there are other ways to represent differences in market sizes, I prefer this over
others (e.g. constant price elasticity) because it implies that, for a given quantity, the larger market
will have a higher price.

6

7

For a model where consumers lobby in a similar framework, see Rosendorff (1996).

8

In autarky, it is assumed that λ = 1 since firms would not lobby for protection.
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as given.9 Before the foreign firm makes output decisions, it chooses whether to
stay or to exit the home market. Firms are identical and have constant marginal
production costs, which, for simplicity, are assumed to be zero.
This model sketches a broad, but tractable picture of the effects of AD legislation which is consistent with most AD cases. First, AD law is considered as an
anti-discriminatory device decreasing inter-firm rivalry to the benefit of domestic
firm. Second, even though AD duties are not observed in this model, it is well
known that a significant share of investigations ends up with price or quantity undertakings and no duties.10 Third, with an AD law in effect, firms respect the constraint
due to the threat of an investigation and being hit by a duty. Anderson et al. (1995)
and Anderson and Schmitt (2003) use a similar model to analyze the effect of AD
legislation in developed countries. The three-stage game is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The Three-Stage Game of Trade Policy Determination

Keep segmented
markets

DG

τ

FF

(No AD Law)

x1

DF

x2 x2

DG
Switch to
integrated markets
(AD Law)

DG

τ

x1

DF
FF

x2 x2

Source: Own elaboration.

Protection under Segmented and Integrated Markets
The domestic government’s equilibrium is obtained by solving this game through
backward induction. In this section, I solve the last two stages of the game without
AD law and with AD law.

A duopoly model with differentiated goods and linear demands was firstly introduced by Dixit
(1979). Singh and Vives (1984), Bian and Gaudet (1997), Bernhofen (2001), Zanchettin (2006),
among others, employ it to study the role of product differentiation on market outcomes.

9

10

See Prusa (1992) and, for the Latin American case, Finger and Nogués (2006).
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When markets are segmented, equilibrium prices can be determined separately
for each market. The foreign firm maximizes its profits in the two markets independently, i.e., third-degree price discrimination.
Superscript S denotes equilibrium variables with no AD law.

Third Stage: Competition between the Domestic and Foreign Firm
The profit of firm 1 in the domestic market is π1 = (a – x1 – cx2)x1, whereas the profit
of firm 2 in both markets can be written as π2 = (a – x2 – cx1)(x2 – τ) + (a – x2)x2.11
Solving for the Nash equilibrium quantities, I obtain:

(6)

The degree of product differentiation in the industry is inversely related to the
intensity of competition among firms.12 Consequently, a higher degree of product
differentiation (i.e. a lower value of c) increases the market power of each firm. In
the polar case of maximum product differentiation (c = 0), both firms are monopolists in the domestic market dsdsfdfsdsfsdfjhgdsjfghjsf. Note that the restriction
fsdhjfghdshfdjsdf is required for there to be intraindustry trade. If sdfdfhsfd, there
is a monopoly in the domestic firm’s market with foreign firm excluded by too
high export cost.
According to WTO law, if a firm exports a product at a price lower than the
price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to be dumping the
product. Using this standard definition, this model predicts dumping by the foreign firm into the domestic market. That is, firm 2 uses third-degree international
price discrimination.
Proposition 1. Segmented markets produce unilateral dumping since p2 – τ ≤ p2.

Note that the solution of this problem would be the same as the solution of the maximization
of the two markets separately.

11

See Bernhofen (2001) for a detailed explanation on the effect of the degree of product differentiation on the volume of trade and on the composition of the gains from trade under imperfect
competition.

12

Equidad Desarro. N.º 20 • julio-diciembre del 2013

Trade Liberalization and the Adoption of Antidumping Laws in Developing Countries

Proof. Define the dumping margin as fsdsfsdfdsfdfdsgfjfsd . Replacing equation (6) into equations (3) and (4) I obtain:

(7)

Since dsfhjgdsfhgdhsfgh, and dsgfhj, then dgjhfgds
The first term in the dumping margin is the “market size difference effect”,
which is non-negative because the foreign market is at least as large as the domestic
market. The second effect is the “product differentiation effect”, which is nonnegative because goods are strategic complements. The third term is the standard
“Brander-Krugman effect”, which is non-negative because government values
producer surplus at least as much as consumer surplus, so it never assigns import
subsidies.13

Second Stage: Domestic Tariff Determination
In this stage, domestic government chooses the politically optimal tariff given its
previous choice of not enacting an AD law. Evaluating equation (5) at its optimal
levels with segmented markets and computing the optimal tariff I obtain:

(8)

The optimal tariff is increasing in the government’s relative valuation of domestic profits (λ). This parameter is determined by the lobbying activities of the
domestic industry seeking protection from import competition. Therefore, more
lobbying pressure implies that the government is willing to sacrifice consumer
welfare in exchange for larger domestic profits and sets a higher tariff.14
The optimal equilibrium tariff is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation. The closer substitutes the goods are, the more negative the impact of

13

See Brander and Krugman (1983).

14
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import competition on domestic firm profits. Hence, for a given value of λ, the
government sets a higher tariff the more similar the goods are.15

30

Integrated Markets
When markets are integrated, the foreign firm’s prices are tied in such a way
that the dumping margin is eliminated. Hence, the domestic government sets a
binding constraint on the foreign firm’s maximization problem that requires the
elimination of the difference between FOB prices across markets (γ = 0). Superscript I denotes equilibrium variables with AD law.

Third Stage: Competition between the Domestic and Foreign Firm
The profit function of firm 1 is the same as with segmented markets. The maximization problem of Firm 2 is now subject to the constraint p2 – τ ≤ p2 ors
ɑ – x2 – cx1 – τ ≥ ɑ – x2. The concavity of the profit function ensures that this restriction will hold with equality. Since an AD law entails the equalization of net
prices across markets, firm 2 may either still serve the domestic market without
dumping or else withdraw from its export market.
Solving the case where the foreign firm still serves the domestic market with
an AD law, I obtain the following equilibrium quantities:

(9)

An AD law reduces the foreign firm’s equilibrium output in the domestic market and increases it in the foreign market. Domestic firm output increases in the
domestic country as long as c > 0. The more homogeneous the goods are, the
larger the increase in domestic output is. Figure 4 compares the equilibrium solutions between segmented markets and integrated markets under different degrees
of product differentiation. Not surprisingly, AD legislation raises domestic prices

15

Formally,
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and decreases foreign prices, whereas firm 1’s profits increase and firm 2’s profits
decrease. The prohibitive tariff with integrated markets is dfgsdjfghjdsgfjhsd f
note that
31

Figure 4. Degree of Product Differentiation and Response Functions with Integrated
and Segmented Markets
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Source: Own elaboration.

If constraint to tie markets, foreign firm may wish to give up entirely on the export market in order to raise its domestic price. I assume the decision to enter or exit
the home market is made prior to output decisions. Thus, if the foreign firm exits
the home market, both firms become monopolists in their respective local markets.
An equilibrium with two firms in the domestic market requires that the foreign
firm has no incentive to deviate from this situation. This implies that firm 2’s profits
under integrated markets and trade must be at least as large as firm 2’s profits when
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it is a monopolist in its own market. Given that gfhgkdhfghdfhgksfdjfdsffddh and
fsddshfghj the condition for exit can be written as:dfkdshfkjdhsjkfhdjkshfjdhfjhdsjkfhjkdshdksjhffdsfdsgdagsfdgfdshfsdhsghfdgfdgfdsgfdgfdjgkfdhgfhdjkghdfjkghkjf
dhgkjh
(10)

If domestic tariff is too high τ > τ ex, firm 2 would prefer to exit the market in
the presence of antidumping legislation. Note that τ ex is decreasing in ɑ , the market size of the foreign country, and increasing in ɑ, the market size of the domestic
country. That is, firm 2 is more likely to exit the home market, the smaller that
market is relative to the foreign market. In order to ensure that there exists some
non-negative domestic tariff (τ ex ≤ 0) that entails an equilibrium with two firms in
the domestic market, I restrict the relative size of the foreign economy as follows.

(11)

If the relative foreign market size is greater than this upper bound, firm 2 quits
the domestic market for any tariff. Hence, an AD legislation necessarily involves a
monopoly in the domestic country. Note that the binding tariff for the foreign firm to
stop selling in the domestic market is the exit tariff (τex), not the prohibitive tariff (τ I).
Lemma 1. Under integrated markets and both firms serving the domestic market,
τ ex < τ I
Proof. Suppose .
Solving for c:
ffffdsfghadsgfjhasdgfjhsdajh= 1.633, which is a contradiction because 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 .
Thus, τ ex < τ I
The exit tariff is increasing in the degree of product differentiation. If products
are very similar, the foreign firm faces more competition in the domestic market
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thus it would make lower profits and be willing to give up the domestic market at
a lower tariff than when products are more differentiated.16

Second Stage: Domestic Tariff Determination
The politically optimal tariff (τ I) in the case of AD law and both firms in the domestic market is given by equation 12. Let τ I be the optimal tariff resulting from
the maximization of equation 5 at its optimal levels with integrated markets.17
(12)
where

For homogeneous goods it is easy to show that τ I = τ ex. An increase in the degree of product differentiation involves an opposite impact on the relevant tariffs
in equation 12. On the one hand, it raises τ ex because a reduction in the intensity
of competition among firms boosts foreign firm’s profits in the domestic market.
On the other hand, it decreases τ I because the government chooses a lower optimal tariff since domestic firm is less affected by import competition. Therefore,
the degree of product differentiation determines the solution of equation 12.
The government has no incentives to exclude foreign firm from the domestic
market by setting a tariff higher than τ I. Because domestic firms do not lobby for
protection in autarky (λ = 1), consumer losses -the sum of consumer surplus and
tariff revenue- offset the domestic firms benefits of shutting down foreign trade.
AD legislation has a different effect on domestic producers and consumers.
Domestic firm is better off since it obtains more profits, provided that c > 0.
Consumers, on the other hand, are worse off because domestic prices increase.
Finally, tariff revenue decreases since, for a given value of the domestic tariff, the
foreign firm exports less. The combined impact of these three effects on the government’s objective function, in conjunction with the existence of an exogenous

16

1

Note that I allow for firm 2 to exit the domestic market but I required that there must exist a
non-negative tariff (τex ≥ 0) for which it prefers to serve the domestic market with integrated markets.

17
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bound to multilateral tariffs determines the decision of whether to enact an AD
legislation or not.

34

Trade Liberalization and the Adoption of AD Laws
Consider, now, the first stage in this three-stage game of trade protection. Here, the
domestic government decides whether to switch to an AD law or not. The decision,
of course, depends on which regime can deliver the highest government payoff
in an environment where tariffs may be exogenously bound by multilateral trade
rounds. This section presents the solution of the game for homogeneous goods.
The government faces a trade-off between the domestic firm’s profits and the
consumer welfare in the first stage. Firm 1 is better off with an AD law because it
sells more at higher prices while consumers are worse off because they confront
higher prices. The government collects less tariff revenue because imports decrease. If the government can freely choose any tariff, it will not switch to an AD
regime because the negative consumer welfare effect outweighs the positive firm’s
profits effect.18
Whenever tariffs are bound (τ ) at a lower level than the politically optimal
tariff in segmented markets (i.e. tariffs are effectively bound), domestic profits
decrease because of fiercer foreign competition and consumer surplus increases
due to the reduction in prices. The effect on tariff revenue is undetermined, on
the one hand it increases due to higher import volumes, but on the other hand, it
decreases due to the reduction in multilateral tariffs.
As a consequence of the progressive reduction of multilateral tariffs implied by
different trade rounds, it is optimal for a government to switch to an AD law for a
sufficiently low bound tariff (τ '). At this point the positive firm’s profits effect just
match the negative consumer’s welfare effect of enacting an AD law. The optimal
AD policy in small developing countries is characterized by proposition 2.
Proposition 2:
1. AD legislation will never be enacted if τ > τ', where τ' satisfies GS(τ') = GI(τex)
2. When τ ≤ τ', the government adopts an AD law.
Proof. See Appendix

Since the status-quo regime is no AD legislation, the government’s valuation of domestic profits (λ) must be restricted. See the Appendix for details.

18
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Figure 5. The Choice of Policy Regimes

Government Objective Fuction

GS
GI

Gm

τex

τ'

τI

τS

Domestic tariff
Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 5 shows the optimal antidumping policy with trade liberalization.
When tariffs are not effectively bound, the government chooses no AD law and
sets the optimal tariff in segmented markets (τ = τ S). When τ '< τ ≤ τ ', the best policy is to keep the segmented markets situation and to set τ = τ. When τ ex ≤ τ ≤ τ '
the government finds it optimal to enact an AD legislation and sets τ = τ ex; hence
the applied tariff is lower than the bound tariff.19 Finally if τ < τex the government
sets τ = τ. The gray line in the Figure 5 shows the welfare corresponding to the
optimal antidumping policy.

Heterogeneity in the Timing of AD Law Adoption
The theoretical model explains the adoption decision as a result of the trade liberalization process. Now, the observed heterogeneity in the adoption decision in
developing countries is explained by three features: Political economy motives,

The government does not set the τ = τ in this interval to avoid foreign firm exit and face a
monopoly situation in the domestic market.

19
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"The observed
heterogeneity in the
adoption decision
in developing
countries is
explained by
three features:
Political economy
motives, the relative
domestic market
size, and the
degree of product
differentiation".

the relative domestic market size, and the degree
of product differentiation. Proposition 3 presents
the relationship between the threshold for adoption (τ ') and the relative government’s valuation
of domestic profits (λ), the inverse of the relative
size of the domestic marketdfdfs, and the degree of
product differentiation (c).
Proposition 3:
1. τ' is increasing in λ.
2. τ' is decreasing infdd.
3. τ' is increasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix

A higher government valuation of domestic profits, which reveals more lobbying pressure from
the domestic industry, implies a sooner adoption of the AD law. When facing a
trade liberalization episode, governments with better organized lobbies care more
about domestic firm’s losses than consumers’ welfare gains. Thus, the threshold for adoption of an
"When facing a
AD law is increasing in λ. The first panel of Figure
trade liberalization
6 shows the graphical solution for an increase in λ.
episode,
When obligated to tie markets, the foreign firm
governments with
exits the domestic country sooner for relatively
better organized
smaller countries. In the segmented markets case,
the foreign firm’s profits from the foreign market
lobbies care more
are at least as large as the profits for the domestic
about domestic
market.20 Consequently, a decrease (an increase) in
firm’s losses than
the relative size of the domestic market implies a
consumers’ welfare
decrease (an increase) in foreign firm’s profits from
gains".
the domestic market. Thus, if the foreign firm must

The reason for this is twofold: On the one hand, the foreign market is at least as large as the
domestic market, thus -for the same degree of product differentiation in both markets- the foreign
equilibrium price and quantities are at least as large as the domestic equilibrium values. On the
other hand, due to our assumption of no competition in the foreign market, the foreign firm behaves as a monopolist in fully differentiated goods in its country regardless of the degree of product
differentiation in the domestic country.

20
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integrate its markets in a relatively smaller country, it finds it optimal to exit at a
lower tariff since it would have to tie its own market price to an even lower domestic price. When facing a trade liberalization episode, domestic government delays
its adoption of an AD law to prevent exit because this hurts domestic consumers.
Thus, the threshold for adoption is decreasing in the relative size of the foreign
market (second panel of Figure 6).
Figure 6. Valuation of Domestic Profits, Relative Market Size, and the Timing
of the Adoption Decision*
Increase in λ

Increase in a* / a
G2I
G2S
G2I
G

S
1
S
G1,2

G1I

τex1,2 τ'1 τ'2

G1I

τex2 τex1 τ'2 τ'1

* The exercise assumes an initial situation (labeled with subscript 1) with the following parameter values:
dsf= 1.1, λ = 1.1, c + 1. The government objective function with segmented markets is represented with
dashes lines. The first panel represents an increase in λ to 1.3, whereas the second panel corresponds to an
increase in to 1.25. The arrow at the bottom of each graph shows the direction of change in the threshold
tariff for adoption of AD legislation.
Source: Own elaboration.

Since the degree of product differentiation is inversely related to the intensity
of competition, foreign firm’s profits in the small country with segmented markets
are decreasing in c.21 The foreign firm’s profits in the foreign market are indepen-

Recall that c goes from maximum product differentiation (c = 0) to minimum product differentiation (c = 1). Thus, an increase in c is a reduction of the degree of product differentiation
whereas a decrease in c is an increase of the degree of product differentiation.
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dent of the degree of product differentiation since there is no competition in the
foreign market. When the foreign firm is obligated to equate the net domestic
price —which is a function of the degree of product differentiation— with the
foreign price —that is always set at the fully differentiation level due to the absence
of competition—, the negative net effect on its profits sdffddddfdssis smaller, the
more differentiated the goods are.22 The first panel of Figure 7 shows the relation
of net profits for both firms with product differentiation.
Antidumping legislation implies an increase in domestic prices. When products are perfectly homogeneous, the home price of the domestic output increases
at the same level as the home price of imports. On the other hand, when goods are
fully differentiated, the home price of the domestic product is not affected by AD
legislation (second panel, Figure 7). For any degree of product differentiation, consumers are worse off with the adoption of the law, since the net change in domestic
prices dufhsudhfiusdhifhsd
is positive. Tariff revenue always decreases with an
AD law since foreign firm reduces exports to the domestic market. Thus, consumer
welfare (consumer surplus plus tariff revenue) is more negatively affected when
goods are more alike. The last panel of Figure 7 shows this relationship.

38

Figure 7. Effect of AD Legislation on Profits, Domestic Prices and Consumer Welfare
∆πi = πIi – πiS

∆pi =pIi – piS
∆π1
∆p1

∆p2

0

∆π2
0

1
Degree of Product Differentiation

0

1
Degree of Product Differentiation

The conversely is true for the domestic firm, the positive net effect on its profits is smaller the
more differentiated the good are.
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∆ Consumer Welfare

0

39

0

1
Degree of Product Differentiation

Source: Own elaboration.

Having explained the solution of the model with homogeneous goods, we
should analyze the effect of a progressive movement towards product differentiation and its impact on the timing of adoption. Consider a situation where the
bound tariff is equal to the threshold tariff for adoption with homogeneous goods
(called τ 'c=1), and compare this result with the first-stage solution (same bound
tariff) with some degree of product differentiation.23 Recall that the government
decides to enact AD legislation at the point where the positive domestic profits’
effect just match the negative consumer welfare’s effect of switching to integrated
markets. When goods share some degree of product differentiation, a change to
integrated markets entails a smaller increase of domestic profits and a lower consumer welfare losses compare to the homogeneous goods situation (Figure 7).
The reduction in net domestic profits is larger than the reduction in consumer
welfare losses, and thus each marginal increase in product differentiation (reduction in c) signifies that consumer welfare losses outweigh the domestic firm’s
gains. This implies that, at τ = τ 'c=1, the government chooses not to switch to an
AD regime. Consequently, the optimal threshold for adoption is decreasing in the
degree of product differentiation (Figure 8).

23

I assume that the change in c is marginal in such a way that τI = τex still holds.
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Figure 8. Degree of Product Differentiation and the Timing of the Adoption*
Decrease in c

40
G2S
G2I

G1S

G1I

τ1ex τex2 τ'2 τ'1
* The exercise assumes the same initial values as in Figure 6. The change in c corresponds to a decrease
of product differentiation to 0.9.
Source: Own elaboration.

Concluding Remarks
The reduction in tariffs that the world has witnessed in the last 40 years has led
governments to resort to other mechanisms to constrain trade. Antidumping legislation, originally a privilege of the developed countries, is now the most widely
used policy device worldwide. This paper proposes a theoretical framework to
explain the observed heterogeneity in the time of adoption of antidumping laws in
developing countries. The analysis is based on a three-stage game of trade policy
determination with imperfect competition in differentiated goods, where tariffs
are exogenously bound due to multilateral trade rounds.
Trade policy is the result of the government analysis to resolve trade-offs
between surpluses of domestic market participants. On one hand, the boost in
import competition created by tariff reductions decreases producer surplus, while
increasing consumer surplus. On the other hand, an adoption of AD legislation
decreases inter-firm rivalry to the benefit of the domestic firm and to the disfavor
of the consumer welfare. In a trade liberalization episode where the potential lobby for protection is reflected in the government’s objective function, it is shown
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that the implementation of AD legislation is the government’s best response when
multilateral bound tariffs reach a sufficiently low threshold.
This threshold for adoption among developing countries depends on three
idiosyncratic factors. Countries with high lobbying pressure for protection enact
AD legislation sooner because the government cares more about the negative
impact that trade liberalization bears for domestic producers. A government in a
relatively small domestic market delays the enactment of AD legislation to prevent
exit from the foreign firm due to the requirement of integrated markets. Finally,
since the degree of product differentiation is inversely related to the intensity of
competition in the domestic market and, thus, to the level of domestic profits, AD
laws are approved sooner when trade is performed in more homogeneous goods.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
44

1. Primitive assumptions of the model.
λ > 1, ɑ > 0, ɑ > 0, and 1 ≤ ≤ 1.3025. The upper bound of the relative foreign market size is given by equation 11.
2. GI(τex) > GS(τex): The government objective function evaluated at the exit tariff is greater with integrated markets than with segmented markets.
Let G = GI(τex) – GS(τex). By means of contradiction I will show that G > 0

Suppose G ≤ 0. Thus, the following condition must hold:

Since ≤

, then 1 <

Solving this inequality, λ ≤
λ >1. Thus G > 0.

= 0.9640, which is a contradiction because

3. GS(τS) > GI(τex): The government prefers segmented markets and the optimal
tariff rather than integrated markets and the exit tariff.
Let G = GS(τS) – GI(τex).
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Since ɑ > 0, I can divide G by ɑ2 without changing the sign of this expression.
Below each component of the next equation is the condition for it to be positive.

45

It is easy to see that in interval 1 < λ ≤ 1.5, the second term outweighs the third
term. Thus, the first term determines the sign of the equation; therefore, I need
the restriction 1< λ < 5.5 for G > 0.24
4. GS(τ) is strictly concave and τex < τS: Since the exit tariff is to the left of the
optimal tariff in segmented markets, GS(τ) is increasing between τex and τS.
dsfsdfsdffhjgsdhjfgjhsdgf because, by step 3,1 < λ < 5.5.

fhjdsgfhjsdagfhjsdgfjhgsdjhfgajshdgfhjds. By means of contradiction suppose
that τex ≥ τS, thus:

Since 1 ≤

Conceptually, it means that government’s valuation of local profits cannot be so high to begin
with so it prefers to set an AD legislation when tariffs are not constrained by any trade agreement.
Recall that the status-quo regime is no AD legislation.

24
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Solving this inequality, λ ≤ 0.12, which is a contradiction because λ < 1. Thus
τ ex < τ S.

46

5. By steps 2 and 3, GS(τex) < GI(τex) < GS(τS). By step 4, GS(τ) is increasing in
the interval [τex, τS]. Then, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
τ' ∈ (τex, τS) such that GS(τ') = G' (τex). For the proof of the intermediate value
theorem see Rudin (1976), Theorem 4.23, p; 93.
QED

Proof of proposition 3
1. τ' is increasing in λ.
Since λ shifts both segmented markets and integrated markets government
functions by the same proportion, and since τex does not depend on λ, a
necessary and sufficient condition for τ' be increased in λ is to show that
G(τex) = GI(τex) – GS(τex) is increasing in λ. Since GS(τ) is increasing between
[τex, τS], then τ' must be increasing in λ (see Figure 6).

I show that this expression is positive by a contradiction. Divide this equation
by ɑ and suppose it is non-positive, thus,

Which is a contradiction since 1 ≤
≤ 1.3025.
ex
Therefore, G(τ ) ≤ 0 and τ' is increasing in λ.
QED
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2. τ' is increasing in .
Suppose that ɑ is a constant and ɑ changes. Thus I need to show that τ ' is
decreasing in ɑ .
GS(τ) does not depend on ɑ . Thus, a sufficient and necessary condition for τ '
be decreased in ɑ is that τ  ex is decreasing in ɑ (see Figure 6).

This expression is negative for any degree of product differentiation. Suppose
it is not, then fdgjdlfsgjklsdfjgkldf ,d , which implies 3.69 = dffdshfkjdshfjd;
which is a contradiction because 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. Therefore, τ ' is decreasing in ɑ .
Suppose that ɑ is a constant and ɑ changes. Thus I need to show that τ ' is
increasing in ɑ.
Again this implies that τ ex must be increasing in ɑ

Which is positive for 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
QED
3. τ ' is increasing in c.
A change in c shifts both government objective functions and the exit tariff.
A necessary and sufficient condition for τ' be increased in c is to show that
τex and ∆G(τex) = GI(τex) – GS(τex) are decreasing in c. Since GS(τ ) is increasing
between [τ  ex, τ  S] then τ' must be increasing in c (see Figure 8).
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Recall that the relative size of the foreign market must the following condition
fsdfhjksdfsdsdhfjdshjfdskjfjkf. This implies 1.3025 ≤ ≤ 2.4142. Furthermore,
assume a small deviation from c = 1 such that τ  I = τ  ex still holds.25
48
■■

τ  ex is decreasing in c

implies

Since

then

= 8.2426. Given that 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, this condition holds.
■■

G(τex) is decreasing in c
G(τex) can be written as G(τex) = AB, where

25 Comparing equations 10 and 12 it is possible to find a threshold c such that τex ≤ τI. This condition is quiet cumbersome to be written here but it is available for the interested reader.
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Then

49

QED
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